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ARGUMENT 
This is a case of statutory interpretation. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated: 
Tf 17 When interpreting a statute, this court looks first to the statute's 
plain language to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose. 
Lovendahl v. Jordan Sck Dist.t 2002 UT 130, If 21, 63 P.3d 705. We 
read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its 
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and 
related chapters. State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, | 8, 63 P.3d 667; 
State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \ 54, 63 P.3d 621 (Regarding 
"whole statute" interpretation, the court stated: " 'A statute is passed 
as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one 
general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section 
should be construed in connection with every other part or section so 
as to produce a harmonious whole.' " (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 96:05 (4th ed.1984))). We 
follow " 'the cardinal rule that the general purpose, intent or purport 
of the whole act shall control, and that all the parts be interpreted as 
subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest object.' " *598Faux v. 
Mickelsen, 725 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah 1986) (quoting Sutherland, 
supra, § 46.05). 
Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 597 (Utah 2003). 
The Statute before the court is the Utah "Savings Statute," Utah Code Ann. 
§78B-2-l 11. It provides in pertinent portion "If any action is timely filed ... and if 
the plaintiff fails in the action otherwise than upon the merits, and if the time 
limited either by law or contract for commencing the action has expired, the 
plaintiff. .may commence a new action within one year of the reversal or failure." 
In this case, it is beyond dispute that the action was timely filed. It is also beyond 
dispute that the action was not dismissed upon the merits. The question before the 
court is the interpretation of "if the time limited...by law for the commencement of 
the action has expired." 
1 
The facts in this case are undisputed. At the time the first complaint was 
dismissed, the time allowed under the Governmental Immunity Act to sue the 
State had not expired. The time allowed under the Immunity statute expired prior 
to the time the second complaint was filed. However, the time allowed under the 
Savings Statute had not expired. 
The State claims that if the plaintiff had dismissed after the running of the 
time allowed by the Immunity Statute, the Savings Statute would have been 
effective and the complaint would have been allowed. However, the State 
maintains that because there was time remaining under the immunity statute, 
Plaintiffs must file within the year allowed, or their complaint is untimely. 
Plaintiffs claim that it does not matter if the second complaint was filed within the 
Immunity year as long as it was filed within the time allowed by the Savings 
Statute. 
The State of Arizona has faced the exact problem. In Janson v. 
Christensen, M.D., 808 P.2d 1222 (Arizona 1991), the Jansons brought suit for 
medical malpractice. The alleged malpractice occurred in September 1985. Suit 
was filed on May 21, 1987 and dismissed without prejudice on February 8, 1988. 
The Jansons then filed a new complaint on March 29, 1988. 'The doctors moved 
to dismiss the second suit, arguing that the savings statute applies only when the 
previous action is terminated after the statute of limitations has run. Under this 
interpretation, the Jansons could not invoke the statute because their first suit was 
dismissed before the limitations period had expired, and therefore, without the aid 
2 
of the statute, their second suit was barred." 
The Arizona statute, A.R.S. §12-504(A), contained the first two 
requirements: Timely filing and dismissal not on the merits. It provides that the 
plaintiff "may commence a new action for the same cause after the expiration of 
the time so limited..." The Arizona court disagreed with the doctors and held it 
irrelevant that the statute of limitations on the underlying case had not run when 
the original action was dismissed. 'The doctors' interpretation of the saving 
statute would result in severe and arbitrary application of the provision, a result 
that we believe countermands the statute's obvious remedial purpose. The savings 
statute is broadly worded and we must assume, unless and until the legislature 
informs us otherwise, that it is worded broadly to ensure its remedial purpose. For 
example, assume Plaintiff A and Plaintiff B both have causes of action with 
statutes of limitations expiring on the same day. Both plaintiffs file timely actions 
and both actions are dismissed for insufficiency of process. By fate, however, A's 
suit is terminated the day before the limitations period expires; B's suit is 
terminated the day after the period expires. Under the doctors' interpretation, 
although A and B are separated only by the vagaries of fortune, only B can rely on 
the saving statute to refile, because her suit was terminated after the limitations 
period had expired." 
As cited in the opening brief, the Utah Court has relied upon the same 
policy issues and the same broad language to hold that the savings statute is to be 
broadly construed as remedial. Standard Federal Sav. And Loan Ass 'n, 821 P.2d 
3 
1136 (Utah 1991). This court should do likewise. 
The interpretation put forward by the State is just as arbitrary in Utah as it 
is in Arizona. It leads to the same unjust and unfair results. More importantly the 
language of the statute reads "the time for commencing the action has expired." 
The plain meaning of this language, in Utah as in Arizona, would indicate that at 
the time of the second filing, the underlying statute of limitations had expired. 
There is simply nothing in the words of the statute that requires a second filing 
within the original statute of limitations. The State's position is mischievous, 
arbitrary, and contrary to good sense and the literal terms of the savings statute. 
This Court should follow the lead of the Supreme Court and hold the 
savings statute to be remedial. It should also interpret the statute in a common 
sense manner that avoids arbitrary and unfair results. Thus, the Court should hold 
that it is irrelevant that the plaintiffs timely filed lawsuit was dismissed within the 
statute of limitations as long as the second suit was filed within the one year 
granted by the Savings Statute. 
DATED this & day of / i / ^ ^ ^ 2009. 
PARKER & McCONKIE 
7k£ 
Kenneth D. Lougee 
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Chapter 7 Govemmental Immunity Act of Utah 
Section 403 Notice of claim -- Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier within 60 days — 
Remedies for denial of claim. 
63G-7-403. Notice of claim ~ Approval oi "mental entity iiisurance carrier 
within 60 days — Remedies for denial of claim. 
(1) (a) Within 60 days of the filing of a notice of claim, the governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall 
inform the claimant in writing that the claim has either been approved or denied. 
(b) A claim is considered to be denied if at the end of the 60-day period, the governmental entity or its 
insurance carrier has foiled to approve or deny the claim. 
(2) (a) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district court against the governmental 
entity or an employee of the entity 
(b) The claimant shall begin the action within one year alter denim ui mc nana or within one year after the 
denial period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of whether '"• "ot the function giving rise to the 
claim is characterized as governmental. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 63G07 040300.ZIP 1,979 Bytes 
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Chapter 2 Statutes of Limitations 
Section 111 Failure of action — Right to commence new action. 
HMzlrllh Failure of action — Right to commenc *i. 
(1) If any action is timely filed and the judgment for the pkiniiii & icvui^cd, or il the plaintiff fails in trie aui> 
or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or contract for 
commencing the action has expired, the plaintiff or if he dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives, 
may commence a new action within one year after the reversal or failure. 
(2) On and after December 31, 2007, a new action may be commenced under this section only once. 
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A. If an action is commenced within the time limited for the action, and the action is terminated in any 
manner other than by abatement , voluntary dismissal, dismissal for lack of prosecution or a final 
judgment on the merits, the plaintiff, or a successor or personal representat ive, may commence a new 
action for the same cause after the expiration of the time so limited and within six months after such 
terminat ion. If an action timely commenced is terminated by abatement , voluntary dismissal by order of 
the court or dismissal for lack of prosecution, the court in its discretion may provide a period for 
commencement of a new action for the same cause, al though the time otherwise limited for 
commencement has expired. Such period shall not exceed six months from the date of terminat ion. 
B. The provisions of subsection A apply to judgments on appeal. The date of issuance of the mandate by 
the appellate court consti tutes the date of termination of the action for the purposes of computing the 
time limited for commencement of the new action. 
C. If a new action on the same cause of action is commenced by the plaintiff, his successor or tlis 
personal representat ive, the assert ion of any cause of action or defense by the defendati t iii t l le ilew 
action is timely if it was or could have been timely asserted in the prior action. 
D. If an action timely commenced is dismissed because the named plaintiff is not the proper party to 
bring the act ion, the provisions of this section apply to an action subsequently brought by the proper 
party, provided that the dismissed action was sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the claim 
sought to be asserted. 
E. The provisions of this section are applicable to actions terminated by orders of dismissal entered on or 
after the effective date of this section. 
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